Knowledge of the Law as Analytic A Priori

The thorough understanding, tactical acquisition, and prudent application of legal knowledge to specific factual instances can be greatly enhanced through even a rudimentary epistemological understanding of the different classes or types of knowledge. Knowledge gained from interpreting legal rules—depending on their verbiage, scope, context, and implication—can be of different types. Much can be made of this topic but for purposes of this post we will limit ourselves to only considering how legal knowledge fits into one such type of knowledge: analytic a priori.

Before we delve into any particular type of knowledge, it behooves us to first more precisely define the generic word knowledge within the context of legal interpretation. The classical philosophical definition of knowledge is “justified true belief” (JTB). Though the JTB framework can be used for the purposes of our discussion without any serious distortion in the classification of the type of knowledge we are concerned with, we would, nonetheless, be better served by slightly customizing the definition. I recommend accomplishing this by substituting the words true and belief in this definition with valid and conclusion, respectively, thereby redefining knowledge as justified valid conclusion (JVC). Regarding the reason for my recommendation, suffice it to say that while JTB fits denotatively, it does not fit connotatively; JVC, on the other hand, fits both denotatively and connotatively. For the remainder of this post, knowledge should be understood to signify a justified valid conclusion based on a reasonable and proper interpretation of the language of the law.

Relationships between ideas that are necessarily true are called analytic. Analytic propositions are statements that are necessarily true by virtue of the meanings of the words or the concepts used to describe them. Put another way, analytic propositions are true on the basis of the interrelationships between the concepts involved. The veracity of analytic propositions can be determined solely through analyzing the meanings conveyed by such propositions. Their construction is such that they are irrefutable and this renders their denial self-contradictory. 

Consider the following two convenient examples of analytic propositions:

1. “All bachelors are unmarried.”

2. “All triangles have three sides.”

A priori is a Latin term, the literal translation into English of which is “from the one before.” The term is used to signify knowledge that proceeds from deduction rather than from empirical observation or sensory experience. Thus a priori knowledge is necessarily a type of knowledge that is gained without recourse to, and independent of, observation or experience. A priori knowledge is generally considered analytic in nature though the two concepts are not coterminous given the former has its provenance in epistemology whereas the latter has its provenance in semantics.

Consider the earlier considered example of the analytic proposition that all bachelors are unmarried within an a priori context. Indeed, the proposition is axiomatic in a manner such that we need not consult a bachelor to verify his lack of a spouse.

Now let’s consider how knowledge derived from a relevant portion of Section 6013(a) of the Internal Revenue Code (i.e., U.S. federal statutory tax law), a commonly referred to provision in tax practice, falls into this category of knowledge:

“Section 6013(a). Joint returns. A husband and wife may make a single return jointly of income taxes…”

Based on a correct interpretation of this statutory rule, one can gain knowledge, the type of which will depend on its implication and application. For example, the knowledge attained that it is impermissible for two unwed individuals (e.g., let’s say two college roommates in a platonic relationship or a father-son duo) to file a joint income tax return to enjoy certain benefits afforded by the tax law is analytic a priori. This is because this tautological conclusion is purely an implication of the statutory text, devoid of extraneous elements, and true by virtue of nothing other than the concepts involved.

Before closing out, I want to tangentially mention that not all knowledge derived from the earlier considered statutory text need be analytic a priori. For example, the knowledge that it is a violation of the law for two unwed individuals to file a joint income tax return is, for reasons I will expound upon in a future post, not analytic a priori; rather, this knowledge is of the type synthetic a priori.