Delineating Ignorance from Uncertainty through Epistemic Precision

Though “I don’t know” and “I’m not sure” are sometimes the only wise answers one can provide, there is a substantive difference between the two that people going through the motions of life do not meaningfully understand, much less appreciate. The importance of being able to mark one’s position in uncertainty versus one’s position in ignorance is such that it allows for the realization of when one answer is categorically correct, or at least more appropriate, over another. While the decision regarding whether one is unsure versus ignorant is not rigorously mathematical and is ultimately a personal judgment, I believe that it has a core objective basis.

The delineation of ignorance from uncertainty is essentially an epistemological inquiry because the judgment is primarily contingent upon one’s limits of knowledge. Obviously enough, ignorance is the consequence of one having little to no knowledge regarding a given matter whereas uncertainty is a consequence of one having insufficient knowledge regarding a given matter. Thus knowing whether one is unsure or ignorant necessarily requires one to gauge one’s extent of knowledge regarding an indeterminate matter vis-a-vis one’s conclusion regarding such matter. In my opinion this is where most individuals, including myself, struggle because we frequently mistake the claim of ignorance to be interchangeable with the claim of uncertainty and vice versa.

Subjects often resolve underdetermination by applying various reasoning techniques to one’s knowledge regarding the available information or evidence. Axiomatically, and objectively, enough, one’s confidence level with respect to one’s conclusion regarding an indeterminate matter is directly proportional to the extent of one’s knowledge regarding such matter. This can be graphically illustrated as follows:


The graphical representation above is suggestive of the following:

  • If one’s confidence level in one’s conclusion vis-à-vis one’s knowledge ranges between 0-30, one is ignorant.
  • If one’s confidence level in one’s conclusion vis-à-vis one’s knowledge ranges between 31-60, one is unsure (i.e., uncertain).
  • If one’s confidence level in one’s conclusion vis-à-vis one’s knowledge ranges between 61-75, one is reasonably sure.
  • If one’s confidence level in one’s conclusion vis-à-vis one’s knowledge ranges between 76-99, one is almost sure.
  • If one’s confidence level in one’s conclusion vis-à-vis one’s knowledge is 100, one is sure.

Notice that this graph brings to the fore the subjective aspect of such decision-making because there is no universal judgment standard with respect to one’s confidence level that individuals are obligated to adhere to and they are instead free to form their own personal judgments regarding their state of mind. This graph is also very useful in visually illustrating that one’s confidence level need not necessarily be fixed. For example, one may, before finalizing one’s answer, endeavor to obtain additional relevant knowledge in order to shorten one’s inductive leap, thereby increasing one’s confidence level or, contrarily, one could also subsequently discover the insufficiency of one’s extent of knowledge with respect to an indeterminate matter and rightfully claim a lower confidence level.

Though when stakes are high, and a decision must be reached, neither the claim of ignorance or uncertainty are immediately helpful, I believe that a systematic understanding of one’s knowledge with respect to one’s conclusions regarding an indeterminate issue allows for the facilitation, albeit not guarantee, of one repositioning oneself with a degree of prudence and efficiency that abject unawareness cannot. For example, one can better decide whether one would oneself be in a strong position to render an opinion after a reasonably possible effort to further one’s knowledge or to seek the counsel of one more experienced and knowledgeable. That is in itself valuable. Since the construction of such a framework has in its provenance the delineation of one’s ignorance from one’s uncertainly, one must necessarily start with the probing question of the qualitative distinction between “I don’t know” and “I’m not sure.”

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