The idea of the existence of reality
independent of, and beyond our, limited human perception has been exhaustively
expounded and debated in many different philosophical contexts. Different versions
of the same basic premise have been variously called the noumenal world, Forms,
dharma, and The Real among others. For purposes of this blog, I will, as per my
general preference, use the Kantian terms of noumenal/phenomenal although I should be clear that I will not use
the terms within the strict meaning
of Kantian canon. While I am amenable to this idea, I am often troubled by how
it contributes to erroneous conclusions amongst casual philosophers. It has
also, over the years, reinforced in me the idea that in many matters, those who
are oblivious are actually more likely to draw close-to-the-mark, albeit not
accurate, conclusions than those who possess rudimentary or insufficient
knowledge. Alas, that is an altogether different subject that deserves its own
epistemological inquiry on some altogether different day.
My chief complaint about discussions
regarding the impossibility of our familiarization with the noumenal world is
that it is very likely to be misunderstood. In my experience, a sizeable number
of, if not most, casual philosophers usually resort to overly skeptical and
relativist conclusions by unequivocally asserting something to the effect that since
humans are bound to never understand noumena (or truth), all knowledge is merely
a matter of forming subjective ideas and beliefs based on one’s own personal
predispositions. The problem, as I have come to know first-hand, with such
mentality is that it constitutes an assault on truth because those who adhere
to it, at least in its purest form, refute observable facts. This has the
undesirable effect of undermining all claims to knowledge, something that
philosophers have generally declared to be an impossible conclusion to accept
in practice. For this reason, I tend to be partial to the view of logical
positivists who assert that statements about matters of fact and logical
relations between concepts are meaningful.
It is impossible to make verifiable claims
about the world beyond one’s sensory perceptions (i.e., beyond one’s
observations). In order to be verifiable, statements should be such that they
are either based on worldly observations or can be logically inferred from factual
statements regarding such observations. While the idea of the impossibility of
our knowledge of the noumenal world (and therefore knowledge and truth) may
initially appear as smacking of humility, one begins to realize its inherent
arrogance once one considers that it is premised on claims to knowledge of a
world that is unseen and unobservable. Moreover, this unbearably vague, perhaps
even entirely speculative, theoretical edifice leaves the door ajar to each
claimant to imagine a noumenal world all of their own which they can then use
as a basis to formulate their own unique arguments to undermine verifiable claims
to knowledge. To be clear, lest I am misunderstood, I believe that human
sensory perception is imperfect and fallible and it is precisely this very ordinary
condition that holographs the phenomenal, instead of the noumenal, world before
us. Notwithstanding, imperfect perception by no means implies inevitable and inescapable
failure in making worldly observations. Rather, it should be construed to mean
no more than the idea that the limitations of our senses preclude us from
experiencing the world exactly as it
is. This, of course, connotes the sense that humans largely experience the
world as it is whereas the skeptical view connotes the sense that we may be
hopeless.
I do not believe that the noumenal world
is somehow ontologically fantastic or that it exists in a dimension different
than does the phenomenal world. My argument is that forming conclusions based
on what one can observe and reasonably perceive is a wise course of action. For
example, if we observe a bathtub full of water and we conclude that by dunking
our head in it, our hair (provided, of course, that we are not bald) will
become wet and this actually comes to pass upon the dunking of our head in the
water, then it seems that excessively (dare I say, foolishly) deferring to the noumenal is unwise. On the other hand,
if we observe a bathtub full of water and by dunking our head in it, our hair
frequently catches fire instead of becoming wet then we should obviously take
the noumenal/phenomenal distinction as seriously as those who beseech us to do
so. Jettisoning observation-based knowledge in favor of the idea that we, as mere
mortals, can never gain knowledge about reality to me suggests at least a mild
form of self-induced or self-imposed psychosis.
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