The Oft-Present Imponderability of Apodictic Certainty

Philosophers, since ancient times, have asserted some version of the theory that apodictic certainty is a sine qua non for scientific knowledge. Apodicticity—with its literal linguistic definition being demonstrable or capable of being demonstrated—denotes that something is necessarily, axiomatically, or self-evidently true. The point is that apodictic propositions, either factual or logically deduced statements, are beyond dispute. For Aristotle, this was the chief distinguishing feature of science from other domains of human inquiry and knowledge. Based on my, what is most likely a very incomplete, understanding, for a claim to be countenanced as scientific it must minimally be, among other things, apodictic.

To me, as an amateur philosopher, this proviso’s convenient and plain dilemma is that, what appear to be or are considered as, legitimately scientific claims also do not necessarily always bear apodictic certainty. Consider that significant aspects of Newtonian physics were eventually ascertained as imprecise (i.e., unapodictic within our discussion’s context) and superseded by Einstein's Theory of Relativity. Despite its later-discovered apodictic shortcomings, Newtonian physics has never been reclassified (or, dare I say, misclassified) as a non-science and for nearly 200 years Newtonian physics enabled humanity to make marvelous industrial progress. And yet, would not unerring commitment to the apodicticity criterion negate such seminal work’s scientific status?[1]

The apodicticity criterion is further confounded when considering the impossibility of the guarantee that Einstein’s Theory of Relativity may never be upended. So are we to, for the most part, treat science as merely an anachronistic term? In other words, are we to only understand an empirical claim as being scientific up to the moment that it need not be revisited, refined, or revised? Are we to understand that the revelations, however minor or major, of the unapodictic nature of various empirical claims proceeding from the advancement of knowledge necessitates reclassification such that a theoretical edifice previously thought scientific is no longer thought as such? Alternatively, are we to consider mostly all scientific claims as nonscientific due to the ever-present possibility of revision and to consider only a very tiny sliver of empirical claims within the domain of collective human knowledge as scientific? While I am not a scientist, I suspect that practicing scientists would not draw a demarcation line such that it would expel knowledge consecrated to be scientific due to the consensus within the scientific community on the basis of some arbitrary fidelity to the apodicticity criterion. At least some of the consequent implications of this criterion seem untenable to me.

Notwithstanding the forgoing, though scientific claims may not always be apodictic, could it be the case that only scientific claims can be apodictic? As far as this blog is concerned, I will only playfully answer this question by saying that it seems necessary to recast unscientific claims as scientific in order for them to become imbued with apodicticity. This playful response has its provenance in an amusing exchange I had at a recent philosophy club meeting wherein we tangentially tackled this problem. An infrequent member, Mr. C, suggested, in very unequivocal terms, that science was the sole and exclusive arbiter of truth. As a retort, I asked Mr. C whether it was a true unscientific claim that we were in the City of Atlanta. He confirmed the factual truth that we were indeed in the City of Atlanta but did not concede that this was not a scientific claim. Socratically engaging him, I then asked whether it was a true unscientific claim that the Kansas City Chiefs had officially won Super Bowl LVII. He also did not deny this historical truth but nonetheless once again defiantly asserted that this was also a claim of a scientific nature.


[1] And would the practical applications of Newtonian physics be lent the same deference were it summarily regarded as a non-science (although that is an altogether different topic)?

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